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Abstract 
 
In this paper we introduce the “extortion game” and propose a set of experiments aimed at 
studying both the extorter’s and the victim’s behavior. The primary focus of our experiments 
is understanding what determines both the extent of the extortive request and the victim’s 
reaction in terms of compliance. Our results show that the extorter’s requests are proportional 
to the victim’s earnings, similar across victims and positively correlated with the level of 
request the extorter perceives as “fair”. Punishment is rare and the extorted sums are rather 
small. Results also shed light on the motivations that make a victim compliant with extortive 
requests, confirming that punishment plays a role in promoting compliance, but also showing 
the importance of other concurrent factors like information about peers’ behavior and the 
perceived fairness of the request. Overall, our results indicate that fairness concerns matter 
even in a context of extra-legal taxation, shaping both extorters’ requests and victims’ 
compliance 
Keywords 
 
Extortion, social norms, fairness, compliance, inequity aversion, laboratory experiments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction1 
 
The present work aims at understanding the reasons why people do comply to an 
appropriative request and the mechanisms at the basis of victims’ compliance. We introduce a 
new game, called “extortion game”, that has been designed specifically to investigate repeated 
interaction among subjects where one of them can appropriate part of the others’ earnings. 
The design presents a series of features that have never been investigated in the same game: 
we use a “take” frame instead of the typical “give frame” used in ultimatum, dictator and 
public goods games usually studied to explore fairness, equity and reciprocity. Additionally, 
we manipulate asymmetry in subjects roles and in the possibility to earn profits, and we allow 
for the presence of multiple potential victims of appropriation, information sharing between 
them, and multiple rounds in order to explore how extortion and compliance evolve in time. 
Our setup introduces crucial elements of novelty that, first, enable us to derive further and 
original insights on fairness with respect to experimental evidence in the existing literature. 
Second, we propose that the attributes characterizing an extortive request and the cognitive 
processes leading victims to comply with it could present some similarities with those at the 
basis of norms’ compliance. We will then apply the growing knowledge in the domain of 
norm compliance to understand behaviors in the extortion game so to identify a possible 
common core between an appropriative and a normative request. 
Standard theories of norm compliance advocating “punishment, as the most effective way of 
making people compliant with norms” (Coleman, 1990) have been largely challenged 
(Bicchieri, 2006; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004, Conte at al. 2014, Gintis, 2000) and a set of other 
factors have been proven relevant in motivating people to obey norms, such as the legitimacy 
and fairness of the request, the conformity and normative expectations of others, and the 
salience of the norm in question (Andrighetto et al. 2013; Bicchieri, 2006; Tyler, 2006; Xiao 
& Houser, 2011). Similarly, obedience to an extortive request has been mainly explained as 
the result of threats, coercion and violence: “the extortive activity is effective because its 
                                                     
1 The work presented in this paper has been performed in the frame of the GLODERS (FP7/2007-2013) project. The authors 
thank Jordi Brands, Daniela Di Cagno, Diego Gambetta, Alessandro Innocenti, LucaTummolini, the partners of the 
GLODERS project and the participants in the ESA World Meeting in Zurich, the EUROCRIM Conference in Budapest, 
the 8th Alhambra Experimental Workshop in Rome and the 2014 SEET Workshop in Sesimbra for insightful comments 
regarding earlier versions of this paper. 
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victims know in advance that there is the possibility to suffer violent retaliations when the 
request is not accepted” (La Spina, 2008; Becker, 1968). An explanation of compliance to 
extortive requests exclusively in terms of violence and coercion risks to underestimate other 
important motivating factors and then inspire measures for contrasting the extortive 
phenomenon only partially effective.  
Our analysis investigates both the extorter’s and the victim’s behavior: the primary focus of 
our experiments is understanding which factors make an extortive request a persuasive and 
what motivates a victim to comply with it. The focus is on how victims adjust their behavior 
depending on a number of factors, namely the level of punishment, the perceived fairness of 
the received requests, and the information about the behavior of others. Among the factors 
that compliance to extortion might be traced back to, these have been addressed as they are 
have been shown also to affect norm compliance (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fischbacher, 
Gächter, and Fehr, 2001; Bazart and Bonein, 2014; Cialdini, Kallgren, and  Reno, 1991; 
Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992; Tyler, 2006). The underlying intuition is that some of the 
factors leading to norm compliance might also affect the victims’ reactions to extortive 
requests. Fairness concerns matter even in a context of extra-legal taxation, affecting both the 
extorters and victims’ decisions. After recalling the existing literature that can be related to 
this work (Section 2), we present our research questions (Section 3). In Section 4 we describe 
the “extortion game”. Results described in Section 5 show that: on the extorter’s side:  (I) the 
extorter requests are balanced to the victim’s earnings and similar across the different victims, 
showing that each extorter has his peculiar “extortive style”, i.e. he can be more or less 
predatory with his victims but in this he is consistent across potential victims; (II) extorters 
who choose their role make lower requests compared to those who were randomly assigned to 
this role, showing some sense of “responsibility” and fairness towards their victim (with 
respect to the Extorter who gets the role randomly); (III) requests are significantly lower when 
the Extorter has his own source of earnings; (IV) punishment is rare but plays a crucial role in 
increasing compliance; on the victim’s side: (V) information about others’ compliance are 
shown to play a key role in promoting victims’ compliance, and (VI) the perceived fairness of 
the extortive request is significantly and positively correlated with the request made by the 
extorter and shapes victims’ compliance with the request (the less the request is perceived as 
fair by the victim, the lower the level of compliance). In Section 6, we discuss these findings 
and conclude.  
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2. Related literature 
A broad set of experimental findings show that people frequently make decisions that do not 
maximize their monetary payoffs. Experimental subjects reject positive offers in the 
ultimatum game, allocate positive amounts to anonymous recipients in the dictator game, 
contribute voluntarily to public good games although the marginal private return of free-
riding would be higher (Charness and Haruvy, 2002). In the last two decades experimental 
economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that people are strongly motivated by 
concerns for fairness. Games like the Ultimatum Game, the Dictator Game, the Gift Exchange 
Game, the Trust Game, Public Good and Common Pool Resources Games are now well-
established and – although from different angles – all provide clear evidence that people make 
costly decisions in order to behave fairly and to sanction peers’ unfair behavior. Besides the 
experimental outcomes, fairness considerations are relevant in several domains of everyday 
life in individuals’ interaction with family, friends, and even strangers, but also shape the 
behavior of people in important economic domains like firms’ policies, procedural justice, 
collective action problems, and management of shared resources (Fehr and Schmidt, 2003). 
Since the game we propose makes use of a “take” frame, it is worthwhile recalling the key 
aspects of the appropriation game as discussed by Cox and al. (2013) in its fairness concerns. 
Games reproducing appropriation from a common-pool resource ground on the seminal work 
by Walker et al. (1990) where a group of players take part into a non-cooperative game in 
which each player makes an appropriative decision: in particular, players allocate an 
endowment between a Common Pool Resource and a private alternative. The theoretical 
prediction is over-appropriation, in the same extent under-provision is expected in voluntary 
contribution mechanism game, since the only difference for a selfish player is the framing 
(“take” versus “give”) of the two games. Experimental results show that, while symmetric 
provision and appropriation games produces comparable behaviors, power asymmetry leads 
to significantly higher appropriation game than in a payoff-equivalent provision game 
because second-movers generally react by reciprocating previous altruist or selfish behavior: 
when the opponents’ decision is observable, subjects with stronger power appear to be more 
sensitive towards opponents’ selfish choices and react by destroying surplus in order to 
sanction a level of appropriation they judge as “unfair”.  
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The “power-to-take” game (Van Winden, 2001; Rueben and Van Winden, 2010) is an 
interesting version of the “ultimatum game” with the “take” frame. In this game, a proposer 
can make a claim on the resources of the responder; then, the responder can refuse the 
proposal by destroying any part of her own resources (zero and the whole endowment are 
possible options). In this game, each participant has an endowment, but only the responder’s 
endowment is at stake; the responder can destroy any amount of her own endowment. 
Traditional economic theory predicts that a proposer will choose to take all the responder’s 
endowment and that the responder will not destroy: however, responders typically destroy 
some or all of their endowment when faced with requests perceived as “unfair” (i.e., requests 
that are higher than 50% of the endowment), and the proposer hardly asks for all the 
responder’s endowment. This game can be used to capture agency situations where a 
principal decides on an incentives’ scheme for an agent, and the agent’s effort can be crowded 
out, thus reducing both his own and the principal’s payoff: if an employer is too demanding, a 
worker could decide to reduce effort; if a Government asks too much in terms of taxes, a 
worker could reduce his working hours, and so on. The “power to take” game differs from the 
“the ultimatum-game” (e.g. Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 2003; Camerer, 2003) in the 
fact that in the latter the proposer makes a claim on how to split her own endowment with the 
responder (“give” frame), and the responder may accept or not. Results show that the offers 
are significantly higher than zero, and that responders refuse unfair and unequal offers 
although this is not economically convenient for them. Both power-to-take and ultimatum 
games are interesting for studying a dyadic interaction where either the request or the offer 
(respectively) turn out to be motivated by reasons that account for both “profit maximizing” 
(proposers do not want their request or offer to be rejected), but also for “nonprofit-
maximizing” behavior, i.e., are driven by fairness and inequality aversion considerations.    
Another game, although not tested experimentally, present elements related to extortion, i.e 
the “blackmail game” (Ellsberg, 1968). As quoted in Ellsberg’s paper, “the term blackmail 
first entered the English language in the 1500s. It referred to tribute exacted by families or 
clans along the Scottish-English border in return for immunity from raids by Scottish or 
English bands. One way to make a living during that era was to steal sheep and horses from 
the English or Scots and others not paying protection money.” In this game, the (potential) 
victim of blackmailing has an endowment that she can agree to split with the blackmailer: the 
amount to be given to the blackmailer is exogenous and fixed. The victim can accept or 
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refuse, facing the chance of being victim of retaliation. Punishment is depicted as 
exceptionally dangerous for both parties: the victim lose her whole endowment, and the 
blackmailer becomes visible to concurrent bands who aim at controlling the land: both 
players’ payoff drops to zero. This game has not been tested experimentally, but the 
theoretical prediction is observing both no compliance and no punishment, as it is extremely 
costly for the blackmailer to carry out the threatened punishment. Ellsberg admits that 
observing compliance in the real world is plausible: a victim estimates the probability to be 
punished, which could be more or less uncertain according to the specific situation, and 
decides whether or not to yield  based on her level of “critical risk”: to yield, the victim must 
believe that the likelihood of punishment is higher than her own critical risk. Ellsberg also 
considers the chance to modify the payoffs in order to account for binding commitment: if the 
blackmailer does have to punish, the threat needs to be made plausible. The payoffs of the 
blackmailer are lowered in case the blackmailer does not punish, in order to capture the losses 
in terms of honor, prestige and reputation that derive from neglecting the deterrent role of a 
credible threat. In the game, this can be obtained by irreversible destruction of alternatives, or 
by assigning the right to punish to a third party. 
Similarly, predatory-prey models à la Grossman and Kim (1996) capture the interaction of a 
potential predator who chooses between production and appropriation and a prey who chooses 
between production and defensive fortification to be protected against appropriation. Both 
players hold an initial resource endowment, but only defense’s endowment is subject to 
seizure. Carter and Anderton (2001) test the predatory-prey model in the lab introducing three 
treatments that vary the effectiveness of predation from low to medium to high. Although the 
experiment payoff structure circumscribes the opportunities to exercise fairness concern, the 
experimental results show that the convergence to the sub-game perfection is reinforced by 
preference for an equal distribution of payoffs. 
3. Research questions  
The first set of research questions the “extortion game” deals with the extorter’s request and 
in particular with how he decides to shape it in order to make it more persuasive: is the 
extortive request tailored on the victim’s level of profits or independent from them? Is the 
request predatory or reasonable, let’s say “fair”? If an extortive style can be identified, is it 
applied to all victims? Is the request affected by the way the extorter acquired this role?  
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The second set of questions is related to victims’ compliance and is aimed at understanding 
why victims obey to extortive requests: is it just because of the fear of punishment, or is there 
any other concurrent factor contributing to its compliance? Does the fact that an extortive 
request is perceived as “fair” play any role in shaping the victims’ compliance? Is compliance 
conditional to the behavior of other victims or not?  
 
4. Experimental design  
Participants are divided in groups of three subjects, where one subject is assigned to the role 
A and the remaining two subjects are assigned to the role B. In the instructions, we avoided 
the use of any loaded terms and labeled with A the extorter and with B the potential victims of 
extortion. 
Subjects in each group interact for T=10 periods: each period is composed by four stages (see 
below for a detailed description). The features of interaction that are common across 
treatments are the following: subjects of type A can make a request over subjects of type B’s 
earnings: extortion occurs once B (eventually after bargaining) accepts the request. 
Consequently, A’s appropriation of the requested amount of B’s tokens takes place. 
Furthermore, each A has the possibility to punish B by affecting her future chances to earn 
money. 
Concerning the extortion choice, A has two contrasting objectives: appropriate the more he 
can, but without crowding out B’s effort. Concerning the punishment choice, punishment is 
costly, as it reduces A’s chances of further appropriation, but gives A the chance to send a 
signal to a non-compliant B (sanctioning or signaling role of punishment) or to prevent his 
decision to be non-compliant (deterrent role of punishment). Although we expect A to use 
punishment only against non-compliant Bs, there is no formal restriction on the punishment 
target (in principle, also compliant Bs can be punished). 
The theoretic prediction for the one-shot game is the following: since punishment is costly not 
only for B (as it decreases the chance to earn tokens) but also for A, A should never punish B. 
As B anticipates a zero profit (pA=0), then she should decide to be non-compliant (gB=0). As 
A anticipates gB=0, then she should decide to make no request (rA=0): extortion should not 
exist. This game leads to a conclusion that is opposite to the prediction for the “power-to-
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take” game, where the Responder should accept from the Proposer any request but 100%, and 
the Proposer should request (100-ε)%. Furthermore, it presents a multi-lateral interaction that 
is useful to investigate how multiple receivers of an extortive request may influence each 
other in terms of the level of compliance chosen. 
 
4.1 Treatments 
In this section, a description of the four treatments of the “Extortion game” is provided. See 
Table 1 for an overview of the treatments.  
 
      [TABLE 1] 
 
Baseline (Treatment 1) 
In the first stage, all the subjects earn their endowment by taking part in a real-effort task 
consisting of 3 general knowledge multiple-choice questions with 4 possible answers (where 
only one is correct). They have 25 seconds to answer each question. Earnings are expressed in 
tokens and depend on the number of correct answers (40 tokens for each correct answer) and 
how fast they are (each second saved is worth one token). A has the chance to earn her 
endowment in the same way. We choose to use a task which requires both effort and ability to 
explore whether any of them are influenced by the possibility of extortive request and whether 
effort and/or ability are crowded out if a subject is victim of appropriation.  
In the second stage, A receives a feedback on the amount πB earned by each B in her group 
and decides how much to appropriate
2
 (rA) out of πe: also zero and the whole earning πB are 
possible choices. The ratio rA/ πB captures A’s proportional request (when proportion is set 
with respect to B’s earnings); the comparison between rA/ πB and rA/ π-B could be used as a 
proxy for A’s fairness in treating the two potential victims. 
                                                     
2 Again, we do not use loaded terms: instructions speak of “taking” and not of “extorting”. 
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In the third stage, B receives A’s request and decides how much to give (gB) out of rA: also 
zero and the whole request rA are possible choices. The ratio gB/rA captures the degree of B’s 
compliance. 
In the fourth stage, A receives a feedback on gB and has the chance to punish each B in her 
group, by eliminating one or more (up to all the three) questions. A has three options: 
eliminating one question at the cost of 10 tokens (that we ex post classify as “low-intensity 
punishment”), eliminating two questions at the cost of 20 tokens (“medium-intensity 
punishment”), eliminating three questions at the cost of 30 tokens (“high-intensity 
punishment”). In other words, A can choose between 1, 2 or 3 punishment points.   
 
Role choice (Treatment 2) 
This treatment differs from the Baseline in the fact that the roles of A or B are assigned after 
subjects express their preference for assuming the role of A by answering to the following 
statement: “Please express your preference for assuming the “A” role instead of the “B” role 
from 1 (no desire at all) to 10  (very strong desire)”. The subjects make this decision after 
being aware of all the relevant features of both roles, and before starting the ten rounds of 
interaction. 
 
Role choice + asymmetric endowment (Treatment 3) 
This treatment differs from the previous in the fact that only subjects of type B can earn their 
money by answering questions; subjects of type A can make money only by appropriating 
subjects B’s earnings. 
 
Feedback (Treatment 4) 
This treatment differs from Treatment 3 in the fact that subjects of type B receive a feedback 
on the level of compliance of the other B in their group in the previous period. The feedback 
is reported as follows: “In the previous round, the other B subject in your group has given X 
tokens out of the Y tokens A has requested”. 
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4.2. Procedures 
The experiments were conducted at the CESARE Lab of LUISS University in Rome. Subjects 
were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). We ran 8 computerized
3
 sessions between June 
2013 and July 2013, with a total of 171 participants (45 subjects in Treatments 1, 2 and 4; 36 
subjects in Treatment 3). Participants were undergraduate students (63.2% from Economics), 
with 57.3% males. We employed a between-subjects design: no individual participated in 
more than one session. In each session, the participants were paid a 2€ show-up fee, plus their 
earnings from the experiment. At the beginning of each session, participants were welcomed 
and, once all of them were seated, the instructions were handed to them in written form before 
being read aloud by one experimenter. All subjects completed a final questionnaire containing 
demographic information, a statement about the level of percentage request they judged as 
“fair”, and a set of 16 questions where they had to self-report (in a 1-7 scale) the intensity of 
the emotions they felt during the experiment. The sessions took approximately 45 minutes, 
with earnings ranging between 2€ and 19€. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics  
With the exception of the Baseline Treatment, the attribution of experimental role is not 
random, but based on a preference for playing the role of A instead of B expressed by all 
subjects at the beginning of the experiment. As anticipated above, this preference is expressed 
in a scale from 1 to 10, where 10 is the maximum willingness to assume the A role. Table 2 
summarizes the average level of preference expressed by subjects in the four treatments.  
     
  [TABLE 2] 
 
                                                     
3 The experiment was programmed by using the z-tree platform (Fischbacher, 2007). 
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The preference for A’s role is significantly lower when As have no way to earn money other 
than taking tokens from their Bs (what we call “asymmetric endowment”): the average 
preference expressed in Treatment 2 (that equals 6.91), where also As have the questionnaire 
task as source of earnings, is significantly higher than the average preference expressed in all 
other treatments. This results make sense since in Treatment 2 subjects are aware they have 
two sources of earnings (their performance in the questionnaire and the earnings from 
extortion) instead of one only (the earnings from extortion) as in the other treatments. Mann-
Whitney rank-sum tests on significance differences are reported in Table 3 (the third column 
refers to preference for A role, whereas the first and the second to requests and compliance 
respectively. They will be commented on below.). 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
Furthermore, we find a negative and significant correlation between subjects’ preference for 
A’s role and measures of their performance in the task: effort, as measured by the amount of 
seconds they save when answering to the questionnaire - that are converted into tokens in 
order to reward quick answers - and ability - that capture both their competence in answering 
correctly (Spearman correlation test, with coef. = -.118, p = .000, and coef.= -.317, p=.000). 
Descriptive statistics on levels of requests (expressed as percentage of earnings) and 
compliance (expressed as percentage of the request) in the four treatments are summarized in 
Table 4. 
 
[TABLE 4] 
 
Overall, the level of the requests ranges between 31.9% and 48% of earnings, with major 
variations across treatments. Choosing the role of A instead of B determines a significant drop 
in A’s average request. Interestingly, subjects who self-select into the role of extorter end up 
into making significantly lower requests: on average, the levels of percentage request are 
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35.6% in Treatment 1 (“Baseline”) and 31.9% in Treatment 2 (“Role choice”) (Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test on individual averages, with p = 0.065, two-tailed test; see Table 3). A possible 
rationale for this finding is the following: when choosing the role of A, individuals feel 
responsible towards their peers and make moderate requests; when randomly assigned to the 
role of A, they can shift the responsibility of acting greedily to external factors and find a 
justification for high requests. This result is consistent with the experimental evidence in 
Charness (2000), showing that a shift of responsibility to an external authority diminishes 
internal impulses towards prosocial behavior. 
When the endowment is asymmetric, as in Treatment 3 (“Role choice + Asymmetric 
Endowment”), the average request significantly increases, rising to 45.7% (Wilcoxon rank-
sum test on individual averages, with p = 0.000, two-tailed test; see Table 3): the explanation 
is related to equity concerns, since subjects A predate more because they have no other 
sources of earnings other than extortion. 
Treatment 4 (“Feedback”) differs from Treatment 3 on subjects Bs’ set of information only: 
from the second round on, after each interaction B receives a feedback on the other B’s 
previous degree of compliance. Consistently with the fact that there is no difference in the set 
of actions and information for subjects As, the average request (48.0%) is not significantly 
different from the one in Treatment 3 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test on individual averages, with p 
= 0.541, two-tailed test). 
Table 3 also shows that apparently there is no significant difference in the levels of 
compliance between treatments 1, 2, 3, and 4. However, compliance in the Treatment 4 
(“Feedback”) contains an interesting dynamics. When subjects Bs are informed that in the 
previous period the other B in the group has offered more than 50% of requested tokens, they 
react by offering on average 56% of requested tokens. When they are informed that that in the 
previous period the other e in the group has offered less than 50% of requested tokens, they 
react by offering on average 27%. Both compliance levels (in percentages) are significantly 
different from the one observed in Treatment 3, that differs only for the fact that this 
information is not given to Bs. Victims’ compliance is therefore conditional to the behavior of 
other victims.  
Table 5 provides a summary of the number of punishment points that subjects Bs receive in 
all the four treatments. 
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      [TABLE 5] 
 
In general, punishment is used in less than 30% of cases. We distinguish among low, medium 
and high intensity punishment, meaning that subjects Bs experience the elimination of one, 
two or three questions in the following round with the consequent impossibility to earn money 
by answering the question(s). There is no difference across Treatments 1, 2, 3 and 4 in 
frequency and intensity (high, medium and low) of punishment: overall, the number of 
punishment points decreases as interaction goes on, because fewer subjects inflict punishment 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test on individual averages, with p = 0.033, one-tailed test). The use of 
punishment of low intensity is the most chosen strategy by extorters in all the treatments: it 
represents the 61.3% of punishment points whereas medium and high intensity punishment 
are used in 20.6% and 18% of cases respectively.   
 
5.2. Regression analysis 
The following regressions provide a deeper analysis of the determinants of A’s request and of 
B’s compliance, received punishment and performance in the task.  
 
A’s request 
Table 6 shows that the level of the request significantly and positively depends on (1) the 
victim’s earnings, (2) the request made to the other victim, (3) the presence of an asymmetric 
endowment (i.e. the extorter asks for more when extortion is the only source of income). The 
level of the requests depends significantly but negatively on (4) the other victim’s earnings, 
(5) the period of interaction (the longer the interaction, the lower the request), (6) the choice 
of the role (when the subject can self-select into the role of extorter he turns to behave less 
greedily). We found neither gender effect, or any role for faculty and age. 
 
   Giulia Andrighetto, Daniela Grieco and Rosaria Conte 
 13 
      [TABLE 6] 
 
We therefore find evidence suggesting that A’s appropriation request is proportional to 
subject B’s earnings, since the coefficient is positive and significant. Furthermore, subject A 
makes similar requests to both Bs, showing a good degree of consistency in the behavior 
towards his potential victims and therefore exhibiting the same “extortive” style towards both 
of them.  
 
Victims’ compliance 
Table 7 summarizes the determinants of the increase in percentage compliance across all the 
treatments.  
 
      [TABLE 7] 
 
Subjects Bs’ increase of compliance in time depends significantly and positively on (1) the 
A’s request, (2) the victim’s own earnings, and (3) the intensity of punishment received in the 
previous period. The regression confirms that treatments play no role. Subjects Bs increase 
compliance the higher their earnings and the higher the request made by A. Punishment 
appears to be effective in sustaining compliance. Notably, the level of compliance drops 
consistently in the last period, when punishment is not possible: the average level of 
compliance in the 10
th
 round is 17.5%. 
Table 7bis and 8 provide a deeper investigation of the role of feedback in shaping compliance 
in Treatment 4.  
 
[TABLE 7bis] 
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[TABLE 8] 
 
When the feedback on the other victim’s compliance is available, as happens in Treatment 4, 
each subject Bs shapes her own level on compliance on it. Interestingly, in presence of 
feedback punishment turns out to play no role (see Table 7bis), probably neglected because 
comparatively less salient. 
When the feedback informs the B that the other B in the group has offered more than 50% of 
the request token, then the level of her compliance is higher than 50% and viceversa (see 
Table 8). While the difference in the level of percentage compliance between the two Bs is 
42.03% in the first period, from the second period on it drops to 8% and remains stable across 
periods, with the exception of the last period, when it rises again and reaches 17.89%. 
Victims’ compliance is conditional to the behavior of other victims.  
 
Punishment  
Table 9 investigates the determinants of the amount of punishment points that subjects Bs 
receive. 
 
      [TABLE 9] 
 
Unsurprisingly, punishment depends significantly and negatively on (1) the previous degree 
of compliance: the more a subject B accomplished A’s requests, the lower the number of 
punishment points he receives. Furthermore, punishment depends significantly and positively 
on (2) A’s request, and significantly and negatively on (39 time: as the interaction goes on, 
punishment declines. Since the interaction between A and Bs assumes a form similar to a 
bargain that evolves in time, each couple A–B seems to converge to a level of compliance that 
satisfies both subjects and that requires less punishment: in fact, the number of punishment 
points received declines in time. As observed above, there is  no difference in intensity of 
punishment across time and treatments. 
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Effects of extortion on victims’ effort and ability  
What is the effect of extortion and punishment of non-compliant victims on the overall 
economic activity of its victims? Is there any crowding-out effect? The following regressions 
show that the answer is no for what concerns extortion, but yes for what concerns 
punishment. In fact, in each period both effort and ability are significantly and positively 
affected by the amount of tokens extorted in the previous period, that also capture the victim’s 
previous degree of compliance. However, the amount of punishment received in the previous 
period crowds out both effort and ability, as shown in Table 10 and Table 10bis. 
 
      [TABLE 10] 
      [TABLE 10bis] 
 
 
5.3. Fair request and emotions  
In the final questionnaire we ask subjects in both A and B roles to assess the level of request 
they judge as “fair”4 and to express in a scale from 1 to 10 the intensity of a number of 
emotions they could experience during the experiment (happiness, guilt, shame, surprise, 
envy, anger, sadness, irritation, pride, gratitude, admiration, fear, blame, disappointment, 
grief, indignation)
5
. 
The average self-reported “fair request” is about 32% of earnings: it is worth noting that 
subjects As declare a percentage request that was on average 38%, whereas subjects Bs 
reported a percentage request of 28% (the difference is significant, Wilcoxon rank-sum test on 
                                                     
4 See Binmore et al. (1991) for research on subjects’ perception of fairness norms. 
5 The list of emotions and the methodology used for measuring them is based on Reuben and van Winden (2010).  
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individual averages, with p = 0.0001, two-tailed test). Interestingly, the fair request is 
significantly higher for subjects Bs in the Baseline, who show an average percentage of 
40.7% compared to 25.7% of subjects Bs in the other treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum test on 
individual averages, with p = 0.0001, two-tailed test): this could serve as confirmation that 
receiving the role of A at random and then behave consistently is judged less negatively in 
terms of responsibility also by subjects Bs. In fact, Bs tolerate a significantly higher request, 
and consider it as “fair” only in the treatment where As did not choose the role (i.e., the 
baseline). 
The correlation analysis shows that for subjects Bs, compliance is significantly and positively 
correlated to the level of request judged as “fair” (coef. = 0.085, p=.0001). Furthermore, the 
distance between the average request received and the request judged as “fair” is significantly 
and positively correlated with irritation (coef. = 0.050, p=.039), and anger (coef. = 0.085, 
p=.0001). 
For subjects As, happiness and gratitude increase when Bs’ compliance increases (coef. = 
0.262, p=.000; coef. = 0.152, p=.0001 respectively), whereas disappointment and blame 
decrease in Bs’ compliance (coef. = -0.113, p=.001; coef. = -0.071, p=.037 respectively). 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper presents an investigation of both the extorter’s and the victim’s behavior in the 
context of a new game, called “extortion game”, that provides some important insights on the 
extent of how extortive requests are shaped by extorters, how punishment influences victims’ 
compliance, and how victims react to extortive requests that are perceived as more or less fair. 
Furthermore, we explore the effects of informing the victims about the behavior of other 
victims. 
Our results show that the extorter’s requests are proportional to the victim’s earnings, and are 
typically balanced to the victim’s profit and similar across victims. This can be interpreted 
such as each extorter has his specific extortive style that is kept constant across victims. 
Furthermore, an extorter who self-selects into this role makes significantly lower requests 
showing some sense of responsibility and fairness towards their victim (with respect to an 
extorter who acquires the role randomly). Punishment is rare and the extorted sums are rather 
small, about 10% - 15% of the victim’s earnings. 
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Results also shed light on the motivations that make a victim compliant with extortive 
requests: they confirm that punishment plays a role in promoting compliance, but they also 
show the importance of other concurrent factors.  
Nevertheless, if punishment as the benefit obtained in return for the payment of extortion 
money was the only factor affecting victims’ behaviors, then compliance with the extortive 
request could have been explained simply as an instrumentally rational act. However, our 
results show that victims are also sensitive to other factors that do not fit with this 
explanation. In particular, fairness perceptions play an important role: the requests made by 
extorters are positively correlated with the request they perceive as fair; victims who are 
required to pay what they consider to be an unfair amount show lower levels of compliance 
and experience higher intensities of emotions, such as anger and irritation, than when the 
request is perceived as fair. Moreover, information about other victims’ compliance 
significantly affects compliance with extortive requests. Victims tune their compliance on the 
behavior of their peers, showing that conformity to others’ conduct represents a strong and 
robust drive of human behavior (Carpenter, 2004; Moscovici, 1985; Cialdini and Trost, 1998) 
and that social norms influence individuals’ conduct also in situations that are not beneficial 
for the society. Interestingly, these findings show that besides punishment, the perceived 
fairness of the request and others’ compliance are key factors in eliciting individuals’ 
obedience to the requests of an authority, even in contexts that are anti social or harmful. 
These may be considered as factors sufficient to induce obedience independently from the 
content of request and possibly from the specific nature of the authority.  
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Figures and tables 
 
Table 1:  Treatments 
 ROLE 
ASSIGMENT 
ENDOWMENT PUNISHMENT FEEDBACK ABOUT 
THE OTHER B’s 
COMPLIANCE 
T1: BASELINE Random Symmetric Yes No 
T2: ROLE CHOICE Preference Symmetric Yes No 
T3: ASYMMETRIC 
ENDOWMENT 
 
Preference Asymmetric Yes No 
T4: FEEDBACK Preference Asymmetric Yes Yes 
 
 
 
Table 2: Average preference for A role 
  1 2 3 4 
 
Baselin
e Role choice Role choice + As End Feedback 
Average preference     
for A role - 6.91 5.04 5.15 
          
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Significance levels of difference in requests, compliance and preference for A role 
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across treatments 
Mann-Whitney Rank-sum test 
        
  Request Compliance Preference for A role 
      
1 (Baseline) vs 2(Role choice) p=.065 p=.180 - 
2 (Role choice) vs 3 (Role choice+As End) p=.000 p=.837 p=.000 
3 (Role choice+As End) vs 4 (Feedback) p=.541 p=.312  p=.687 
        
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics on percentage requests and compliance 
    1 2 3 4   
  
Variable 
(averages) Baseline 
Role 
choice 
Role choice + As 
End Feedback   
         
  Request level= 35.6 31.9 45.7 48.0   
  Request/Earnings       
         
  
Compliance 
level= 28.6 34.3 33.1 32.9   
  
Appropriation/ 
Request           
 
 
 
 
 Table 5. Punishment points received across treatments 
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  1 2 3 4 
# punishment points 
received 
Baselin
e 
Role 
choice 
Role choice +  
As End Feedback 
          
0 190 162 196 201 
1 68 56 57 57 
2 15 15 25 25 
3 27 7 19 17 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Determinants of A’s request 
      
Subject j’s request to subject i Coef. (Robust 
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Std. Err.) 
   
Subject i's earnings .415*** (.027) 
Subject j's earnings -.250*** (.024) 
Request to j .673*** (.045) 
Period -.435* (.245) 
Role choice -5.972* (3.186) 
Asymmetric endowment 7.683** (3.224) 
Feedback 1.370 (2.982) 
Constant -5.762 (4.674) 
   
Observations 570  
R-sq.overall .719  
Wald chi2 688.23  
      
   
Note: GLS regression. Robust standard errors clustered at subject level are reported in parenthesis. 
*, **  and *** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence, 95% 
confidence and 99% confidence. Controls include: gender, age and major. The xttobit regression 
(with lower limit equal to zero and upper limit equal to maximum request) reports almost identical 
results. 
   
 
 
Table 7. Determinants of B’s increase in compliance in all treatments 
   
Subject i's % compliance in t - 
Subject i's % compliance in t-1 Coef. 
(Robust Std. 
Err.) 
   
Punishment received by i in t-1 .058*** (.024) 
Role choice .001 (.015) 
Asymmetric endowment -.001 (.016) 
   Giulia Andrighetto, Daniela Grieco and Rosaria Conte 
 25 
Feedback -.005 (.013) 
Constant -.081 (.141) 
   
Observations 811  
R-sq .overall .015  
Wald chi2 9.94  
      
   
Note: GLS regression. Robust standard errors clustered at subject level are reported in 
parenthesis. Periods go from 2 to 10. *, **  and *** denote coefficients significantly different 
from zero at the 90% confidence, 95% confidence and 99% confidence. Controls include: gender, 
age and major. The xttobit regression (with lower limit equal to zero and upper limit equal to 
maximum level of compliance reports almost identical results. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7bis. Determinants of B’s increase in compliance in Treatment 4 
   
Subject i's % compliance in t - 
Subject i's % compliance in t-1 Coef. 
(Robust Std. 
Err.) 
   
Punishment received by i in t-1 .034 (.048) 
Constant .144 (.183) 
   
Observations 219  
R-sq .overall .011  
Wald chi2 2.55  
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Note: GLS regression. Robust standard errors clustered at subject level are reported in 
parenthesis. Periods go from 2 to 10. *, **  and *** denote coefficients significantly different 
from zero at the 90% confidence, 95% confidence and 99% confidence. Controls include: gender, 
age and major. The xttobit regression (with lower limit equal to zero and upper limit equal to 
maximum level of compliance reports almost identical results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Determinants of B’s compliance: role of feedback in Treatment 4 
        
 Treatment 4 
Subject i's compliance Coef. (Rob. Std. Err.) 
(Rob. Std. 
Err.) 
    
Subject i's received request .116* (.080) (.043) 
Subject i's earnings .119*** (.041) (.025) 
Punishment received by i in t-1 .557 (.824) (.659) 
Information on j's compliance .186*** (.066) (.056) 
Period -.069 (.428) (.316) 
Constant 9.499 (2.979) (7.088) 
    
Observations 120   
R-sq. overall .499   
Wald chi2 61.26   
        
    
 
 
   Giulia Andrighetto, Daniela Grieco and Rosaria Conte 
 27 
 
 
 
Table 9. Determinants of B’s received punishment points 
   
Punishment points received by subject i in t Coef. (Robust Std. Err.) 
   
Request received by subject i in t-1 .018*** (.003) 
Subject i's compliance in t-1 -.064*** (.008) 
Period -.156*** (.026) 
Role choice -.332 (.415) 
Asymmetric endowment .352 (.416) 
Feedback -.158 (.390) 
Constant -.205 (1.485) 
   
Observations 1138  
Log likelihood 1138.76  
Wald chi2 87.94  
      
   
Note: xttobit regression. The dependent variable ranges from 0 to 3. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. *, **  and *** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence, 95% 
confidence and 99% confidence. Controls include: gender, age and major. 
   
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Determinants of B’s effort in all treatments 
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Subject i's effort Coef. 
(Robust Std. 
Err.) 
   
   
Subject i's compliance in t-1 .167*** (.039) 
Punishment received by i in t-1 -1.970*** (.714) 
Role choice 2.172 (2.251) 
Asymmetric endowment -13.023*** (1.749) 
Feedback .601 (1.592) 
Constant 33.980 (10.022) 
   
Observations 1023  
R-sq .overall .19  
Wald chi2 133.10  
      
   
Note: GLS regression. Robust standard errors clustered at subject level are reported in 
parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 90% 
confidence, 95% confidence and 99% confidence. Controls include: gender, age and major.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10bis. Determinants of B’s ability in all treatments 
   
Subject i's ability Coef. 
(Robust Std. 
Err.) 
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Subject i's compliance in t-1 .286*** (.082) 
Punishment received by i in t-1 -7.858*** (2.129) 
Role choice 4.478 (3.887) 
Asymmetric endowment -3.399 (3.622) 
Feedback 3.586 (3.624) 
Constant 73.883*** (20.606) 
   
Observations 
 
 
 
1023 
 
R-sq .overall 
 
.064  
Wald chi2 
 
56.95  
      
   
Note: GLS regression. Robust standard errors clustered at subject level are reported in 
parenthesis. *, **  and *** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 90% 
confidence, 95% confidence and 99% confidence. Controls include: gender, age and major.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
